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Articles 
AN AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES TO PROTECT 
THE RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS: EXPLORING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF STATE 
EFFORTS 
by Jennifer J. Stearman, Esq. 
"They explained the defendant's constitutional 
rights to the nth degree. They couldn't do this and 
they couldn't do that because of his constitutional 
rights. And I wondered what mine were. And they 
told me, I haven't got any. "- a victim1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Provisions in the United States Constitution 
specifically protect the rights of the criminally accused.2 
There are, however, no constitutionally guaranteed rights 
allocated to crime victims.3 Consequently, crime victims 
'PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME: FINAL REpORT, at 114 
(1982) [hereinafter FINAL REpORT]. 
2See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing freedom from unreasonable 
searches and seizures and requisite probable cause for issuance of warrant); 
U.S. CONST. amend. V (requiring a grand jury indictment for trial on a 
capital offense, prohibiting double jeopardy, protecting against self-
incrimination, guaranteeing due process oflaw); U.S. CONST. amend. VI 
(providing in criminal trials the right to a speedy, public trial by an 
impartial jury, the right to notice of charges, the right to confront 
witnesses, and the right to an attorney); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII 
(prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment). 
3Severallegal commentators have attempted to provide an explanation 
for the lack of constitutional provisions protecting the rights of crime 
victims. See generally Richard Barajas & Scott Alexander Nelson, The 
Proposed Crime Victims' Federal Constitutional Amendment: Working 
Towards a Proper Balance, 49 BAYLOR L. REv. I, 8-11 (1995)(providing 
historical information regarding the role ofthe crime victim and indicating 
that the English common law tradition was one of private prosecutions); 
Jennie L. Caissie, Passing the Victims' Rights Amendment: A Nation's 
March Toward a More Perfect Union, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. 
CONFINEMENT 64 7,649-53 ( (998) (describing the evolution ofthe justice 
system that initially provided private prosecutions in England and 
Colonial America, to a more organized criminal-law system which includes 
public prosecutions); Kathleen Kalaher, The Proposed Victim's Rights 
Amendment: Taking a Bite Out of Crime or a Dog With No Teeth?, 22 
SETON HALL LEGIS. 1. 317, 323-324 ( (997) (examining the historical 
background of the victims' rights movement, and tracing the evolution 
underlying the movement from private actions against the defendant to 
state involvement); Thad H. Westbrook, At Least Treat Us Like 
Criminals!: South Carolina Responds to Victims' Pleasfor Equal Rights, 
often feel neglected and ignored in our criminal justice 
system.4 
As part of a movement aimed at providing more 
balanced rights to crime victims, thirty-one states have 
approved victim rights amendments ("VRAs") to their state 
constitutions.s These VRAs have enjoyed wide margins 
of public support.6 In 1996, the United States Congress 
began consideration of a federal VRA. Since then, the 
proposal for a federal VRA has received both earnest 
political consideration and strong bi-partisan support.7 
49 S.C. L. REv. 575, 576-78 (1998) (tracing the United States system of 
justice to early English law that placed responsibility for justice on the 
victim, not the modem-day prosecutor). 
4See generally FINAL REpORT, supra note I, at 114 (documenting crime 
victim testimony that reflects frustration and feelings of re-victimization 
by the criminal justice system due to institutionalized disinterest); Paul 
G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Case for and the Effects 
of Utah's Victims' Rights Amendment, 1994 UTAH L. REv 1373, 1375 
(stating that crime victims "have come to believe that the criminal justice 
system is out of balance, that their voices are not heard, and that the 
system is preoccupied with defendants' interests and rights"). 
SOver the past sixteen years, thirty-one states have amended their 
constitution to add victim rights amendments (dates of passage are 
indicated in parentheses). See ALA. CONST. amend. 557 (1994); ALASKA 
CONST. art. I § 24 (1994); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1 (1990); CAL. CONST. 
art. I, § 28 (1982); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16a (1992); CONN. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8(b) (1996); FLA. CON ST. art. I, § 16 (1988); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22 
(1994); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.\ (1992); IND. CONsT.art.l, § 13(b)(1996); 
KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 15 (\992); LA. CONST. art. I, § 25 (1998); MD. 
DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 47 (1994); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24 (1988); MISS. 
CONST. art. 3 § 26A (1998); Mo. CONST. art. I, § 32 (1992); NEB. CONST. 
art. I, § 28 (1996); NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8(2)(1996); N.J. CONST. art. 1,22 
(1991); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24 (1991); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 37 (1996); 
OHIO CONST. art. I, § IO(a) (1994); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34 (1996); R.I. 
CONST. art. I, § 23 (\986); S.c. CONST., art. I, § 24 (1996); TENN. Const. 
art. \ (1998); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30 (1989); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28 
(1994); VA. CONST. art. I, § 8(A)(1996); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 35 (1989); 
WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9(m) (1993). 
6For individual state electoral support, see Appendix A. 
7See infra Part II.C. 
30.1 U. Bait. L.F. 43 
Articles 
Despite the apparent public support for VRAs, not 
everyone supports this sweeping movement. Some legal 
scholars have suggested that VRAs would only be 
"symbolic" victories, and would fail to provide any real 
expansion of crime victims' rights.s Scholars and 
legislators are also concerned about the potential impact 
a federal VRA would have on defendants' rights.9 
Recently, United States Senators, critical of the effort to 
enact a federal constitutional amendment regarding the 
rights of crime victims, suggested that before passing such 
legislation, "[a]t a minimum, we should explore the 
effectiveness of the state efforts and the nuances of their 
various approaches before grafting a rigid, untested 
standard onto the U.S. Constitution."10 
While much scholarly debate has transpired over 
the efficacy of a federal VRA, little scholarly inquiry has 
been devoted to assessing the actual effectiveness of those 
VRAs adopted and in use by the states. This article 
presents an initial step in the process of exploring the 
effectiveness of state efforts to provide constitutional rights 
to victims of crime. It is designed to address the concerns 
raised by Congressional leaders in considering the federal 
proposed amendment. 
The article begins with a briefhistorical overview of 
the modern victims' rights movement, including the 
legislative history relevant to the proposed federal 
amendment and an examination ofthe current proposed 
federal amendment. It then provides a comparison of rights 
afforded crime victims by the variety of adopted state 
VRAs. Thereafter, the article surveys state appellate court 
HSee• e.g .. Robert P. Mosteller, Victims' Rights' and the United States 
Constitution: An Effort to Recast the Battle in Criminal Litigation. 85 
GEO. L.J. 1691, 1692-94 (1997) (stating that a federal amendment is 
"unnecessary symbolism at best," and speculating that the amendment 
would provide little direct impact for crime victims); Richard E. Wegryn, 
New Jersey Constitution Amendment for Victims' Rights: Symbolic 
Victory? 25 RUTGERS LJ. 183,207-08 (1993) (predicting that although a 
"victim in New Jersey can now say she has a constitutional right to fair 
treatment ... this will likely be the most substantial effect of the 
Amendment. "). 
9See. e.g .. S. REp. No. 105-409, at 64-67 (1998); Mosteller, supra note 9, 
at 1693. 
lOS. REp. No. 105-409, at 69 (1998). This suggestion was asserted by 
Senate Judiciary Committee members Patrick Leahy, Ted Kennedy, and 
Herb Kohl. See id. 
30.1 U. Bait L.F. 44 
decisions interpreting VRAs. In light of these rulings, the 
article suggests how the proposed federal amendment is 
likely to be construed. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Modern Victims' Rights Movement in the 
United States 
The political momentum of the modem crime-victim 
movement began to escalate during the 1970s, II when 
federal and state statutes aimed at providing rights for 
crime victims were enacted. 12 These statutes provided 
crime victims with monetary restitution and an enhanced 
opportunity to participate in the prosecution, sentencing, 
and parole of criminal defendants. 13 
In 1982 President Ronald Reagan established a 
Presidential Task Force ("Task Force") to investigate the 
treatment of crime victims by the American criminal justice 
system. 14 The final report, issued by the Task Force in 
December 1982, made startling observations about the 
treatment of crime victims by the criminal justice system.IS 
The Task Force observed that: 
The American criminal justice system is 
absolutely dependent on [ ] victims to 
cooperate. Without the cooperation of victims 
and witnesses in reporting and testifying about 
"Several commentators trace the origin of the modern victims' rights 
movement to grass-roots programs formed in the early 1970s. See. e.g .• 
Andrew J. Karmen, Who's Against Victims' Rights? The Nature of the 
Opposition to Pro-Victim initiative in Criminal Justice, 8 ST. JOHN'S J. 
LEGAL COMMENT. 157, 158-59 (1992) (tracing the victim rights movement 
to members of self-help support groups and outreach groups in the 
1970s with a common desire to turn their victimization into something 
positive). 
12See Marlene A. Young, A Constitutional Amendmentfor Victims of 
Crime: The Victim's Perspective, 34 Wayne L. Rev. 51,52 (1987). 
13See id. 
14See PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, 19 WEEKLY COMPo 
PRES. Doc. 521-22 (Apr. 23, 1982). The Task Force was comprised of 
nine members: Lois Haight Herrington, Chairman; Garfield Sobo; Frank 
Carrington; James P. Damos; Doris L. Dolan; Kenneth O. Eikenberry; 
Robert J. Miller; Marion G. (Pat) Robertson; and Stanton E. Samenow. 
See FINAL REpORT, supra note 1, at 142-44. 
I'See FINAL REpORT, supra note I, at vi. 
crime, it is impossible in a free society to hold 
criminals accountable. When victims come 
forward to perfonn this vital service, however, 
they find little protection They discover instead 
that they will be treated as appendages of a 
system appallingly out of balance. They learn 
that somewhere along the way the system has 
lost track of the simple truth that it is supposed 
to be fair and to protect those who obey the 
law while punishing those who break it. 
Somewhere along the way, the system began 
to serve lawyers and judges and defendants, 
treating the victim with institutionalized 
disinterest. 16 
In response to its observations, the Task Force fonnulated 
sixty-seven recommendations for action,17 including a 
modification to the Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution to include a victims' rights provision. IS 
The Task Force proposed the following language as 
an addition to the last sentence of the Sixth Amendment: 
"Likewise, the victim, in every criminal prosecution shall 
have the right to be present and to be heard at all critical 
stages of judicial proceedings. "19 The actions and findings " 
of the Task Force have been considered a catalyst to the 
modem victims' rights movement. Indeed, in 1985 victims' 
rights advocates began to focus their efforts on amending 
state constitutions in order to secure rights that were more 
meaningful for crime victims.20 The success of these efforts 
16Id. 
I'See id. at 115-16. The Task Force made recommendations targeted to 
federal and state executive and legislative bodies, police, prosecutors, 
the judiciary, parole boards, hospitals, the ministry, the bar, schools, the 
mental health community, and the private sector. Seeid. 
USee id. at v. 
19Id. at 114. 
20See Victims' Bill of Rights Amendment: Hearings on s.J. Res. 6 Before 
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, I 05th Congo (1996) (statement of 
Paul G. Cassell, Professor of Law, University of Utah College of Law) 
(detailing the history of the victims' rights movement in the quest for a 
constitutional amendment; stating that organizations supporting a 
victims' rights amendment decided at a 1985 national conference to 
proceed on a state-by-state basis first, then continue the effort for a 
federal constitutional amendment) . 
Articles 
is evidenced by the enactment of victims' rights 
amendments in thirty-one states over the past sixteen 
years.21 
B. Political Efforts Towards a Federal Constitutional 
Amendment 
No serious effort was made to amend the federal 
constitution until nearly fowteen years afterthe Task Force 
released its final report. Congressional action toward a 
federal constitutional amendment began during the l04th 
Congress when the Victims' Bill of Rights Constitutional 
Amendment ("Bill") was introduced in both the United 
States Senate and House of Representatives.22 The 
introduction of the Bill coincided with the 1996 presidential . 
election and was endorsed by both Republican Presidential 
candidate RobertJ. Dole and President WilliamJ. Clinton 23 
Both the United States House of Representatives and the 
Senate Judiciary Committee held public hearings on their 
21For a table indicating states with VRAs and the percentage of electoral 
support received, see Appendix A. 
22See S.J. Res. 52 & H.RJ. Res. 174, I04th Congo (1996). 
23See President William J. Clinton, Remarks by the President at 
Announcement of Victims • Rights Constitutional Amendment, 32 WEEKLY 
CoMP. PRES. Doc. 1134 (June 25, 1996). In announcing his support of the 
federal proposed VRA, President Clinton stated: 
Having carefully studied all of the alternatives, I am now 
convinced that the only way to fully safeguard the rights of 
victims in America is to amend our Constitution and guarantee 
these basic rights-to be told about public court proceedings 
and to attend them; to make a statement to the court about 
bail, about sentencing, about accepting a plea if the victim is 
present, to be told about parole hearings to attend and to 
speak; notice when the defendant or convict escapes or is 
released, restitution from the defendant, reasonable protection 
for the defendant and notice ofthese rights. 
Id.; see also John M. Broder, Clinton Calls for Victims' Rights in 
Constitution, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 1996, at AI; Angie Cannon, Victims' 
Rights Wins President's Support, PHIL. INQUIRER, June 26, 1996, at A2; 
Alison Mitchell, Clinton Calls for Amendment Guaranteeing Victims • 
Rights. N.Y. TIMES,June26, 1996,atAI5. 
30.1 U. Bait. L.F. 45 
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respective Bills.24 The 104th Congress, however, 
adjourned in October 1996 without taking action on either 
version of the proposed amendment. 
On January 21, 1998, during the 1 05th Congress, 
Senators John Kyl and Dianne Feinstein reintroduced the 
Victims' Bill of Rights Constitutional Amendment.25 
Likewise, on April 15, 1997, Representative Henry Hyde 
reintroduced the House version of the amendment in the 
United States House of Representatives. 26 Both the Senate 
and House Judiciary Committees held hearings on the 
proposed amendmentY Senators Kyl and Feinstein 
introduced a new version of the amendment on April 1, 
1998.28 On July 7, 1998, the Senate Judiciary Committee 
voted eleven to seven in support of the Resolution.29 
With each congressional session, the proposed 
federal amendment continues to be considered and enjoys 
bi-partisan support. In 1999, the version of the Bill 
adopted by the Senate Judiciary Committee was 
reintroduced in the Committee during the 1 06th Congress 
and additional public hearings were held in Committee.30 
On May 26, 1999, the Senate Judiciary Committee's 
24The full Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on the proposed 
victims' rights constitutional amendment on April 23, 1996. 
Representative Henry Hyde, Chairman of the House Judiciary 
Committee, conducted a full-committee hearing on the proposed 
amendment on July II, 1996. On September 30, 1996, Senators Kyl 
and Feinstein introduced a new version of the proposed amendment in 
the Senate. 
2S See S.J. Res. 6, 105th Cong., I st Session (1998). 
26See HJ. Res. 71, 105th Cong., 1st Session (1998). 
27The Senate Judiciary Committee held a public hearing on the Senate 
Joint Resolution on April 16, 1997. A full hearing was held before the 
House Judiciary Committee on June 25, 1997. 
2R See SJ. Res. 44, I 05th Cong., 2nd Session (1998). The new amendment 
changes the operative language from "victims of crime" to "victims of 
violent crime." 
29See S. REp. No. 105-409, at 69 (1998). 
3"See SJ. Res. 3, 106th Congo (1999). For the language of the proposed 
amendment, see infra Part II.C. On January 19, 1999, Senators Kyl and 
Feinstein reintroduced the VRA in the 106th Congress based on the 
earlier version adopted by the Senate Judiciary Committee. See id. On 
March 24, 1999, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a public hearing 
on the Joint Resolution. 
30.1 U. Bait L.F. 46 
Subcommittee on the Constitution, Federalism, and 
Property voted in favor of Senate Joint Resolution 3, which 
would create a VRA to the United States Constitution. 
On September 30,1999, the Senate Judiciary Committee 
voted twelve-to-five to recommend enactment of the 
Senate Joint Resolution that would create a VRA to the 
United States Constitution. In the House, on August 4, 
1999, Ohio Representative Steven Chabot introduced a 
House version of the proposed federal VRA for 
consideration.31 
C. The Current Proposed Federal Constitutional 
Amendment 
During the past three congressional sessions when 
the federal VRA has been considered, there have been 
incremental changes in the language and scope of the 
proposed amendment. This section examines the current 
language adopted by the Senate Judiciary Committee for 
the proposed federal amendment and compares the current 
language with significant changes from prior versions of 
the amendment.32 
The current proposed federal amendment is divided 
into five sections and provides: 
Section 1: A victim of a crime of violence, as 
these terms may be defined by law, shall have 
the rights: to reasonable notice of, and not to 
be excluded from, any public proceedings 
relating to the crime; to be heard, if present, 
and to submit a statement at all such 
proceedings to detennine a conditional release 
from custody, an acceptance of a negotiated 
plea, or a sentence; to the foregoing rights at a 
parole proceeding that is not public, to the 
extent those rights are afforded to the convicted 
offender; to reasonable notice of a release or 
escape from custody relating to the crime; to 
consideration of the interest of the victim that 
3IHJ. Res. 64, 106th Congo (1999). 
32The proposed House version of the VRA contains provisions similar 
to the version adopted by the Senate Judiciary Committee on September 
30, 1999. One important distinction is that H.J. Res. 64 would encompass 
victims of all felony crimes and "any other crime that involves violence." 
any trial be free from unreasonable delay; to 
an order of restitution from the convicted 
offender; to consideration for the safety of the 
victim in determining any conditional release 
from custody relating to the crime; and to 
reasonable notice of the rights established by 
this article. 
Section 2: Only the victim or the victim's lawful 
representative shall have standing to assert the 
rights established by this article. Nothing in 
this article shall provide grounds to stay or 
continue any trial, reopen any proceeding or 
invalidate any ruling, except with respect to 
conditional release or restitution or to provide 
rights guaranteed by this article in future 
proceedings, without staying or continuing a 
trial. Nothing in this article shall give rise to or 
authorize the creation of a claim for damages 
against the United States, a State, a political 
subdivision, or a public officer or employee. 
Section 3: The Congress shall have the power 
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. 
Exceptions to the rights established by this 
article may be created only when necessary to 
achieve a compelling interest. 
Section 4: This article shall take effect on the 
180th day after the ratification of this article. 
The right to an order of restitution established 
by this article shall not apply to crimes 
committed before the effective date of this 
article. 
Section 5: The rights and immunities established 
by this article shall apply in Federal and State 
proceedings, including military proceedings to 
the extent that the Congress may provide by 
law, juvenile justice proceedings, and 
proceedings in the District of Columbia and 
any commonwealth, territory, or possession of 
the United States.33 
33S.1. Res. 3. 
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The current version of the proposed federal VRA 
has subtle differences from earlier proposed amendments. 
In particular, the scope of the amendment has changed. 
Earlier versions of the proposed amendment provided that 
the amendment was applicable to "[e ]ach victim of a crime 
of violence, and other crimes that Congress may define 
by law.''34 This language has been changed and now states 
that the amendment is applicable to "[a] victim of a crime 
of violence, as these terms may be defined by law."3s 
Thus, the current version limits the applicability of the 
amendment solely to victims of violent crime. 
In addition to establishing the scope of the proposed 
federal amendment, the first section establishes the 
affirmative rights of crime victims. Unlike most of the state 
VRAs, the proposed federal constitutional amendment 
does not mention the right of the victim to be "treated with 
fairness and respect. "36 Among the rights conferred by 
the amendment are the right to notice of and not to be 
excluded from public proceedings related to the crime, to . 
be heard, to receive notice of the accused's release from 
custody, the right to a trial free from unreasonable delay, 
to restitution, to consideration of the victim's safety in 
detennining conditional release from custody, and to notice 
of the victim's rights.37 
After listing the affinnative rights granted to crime 
victims, section two of the proposed amendment addresses 
standing and limitations on enforcement of the . 
amendment. 38 This section explicitly denies any grounds 
for a victim to stay or continue a trial or challenge a decision 
or conviction.39 Section two also provides that violation 
34S.1. Res. 6, 105th Cong., 1st Session (1997) § 1 (emphasis added). 
Interestingly, the version considered in the House of Representatives 
provided: "[e)ach individual who is a victim of a crime for which the 
defendant can be imprisoned for a period longer than one year or any 
other crime that involves violence." H.1. Res. 71, 105th Cong., Ist 
Session (1997). 
3lSee S.1. Res. 44, 105th Cong., 2nd Session (1998); S.1. Res. 3, 106th 
Congo (1999). 
36See S.l. Res. 3. 
37See id at § 1. 
31See id at § 2. 
39See id. 
30.1 U. Bait. L.F. 47 
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of the amendment does not give rise to a claim for damages 
against the govemment.40 
The third section of the proposed amendment 
empowers Congress to enforce the article "by appropriate 
legislation."41 Section three also limits exceptions to the 
rights conferred in the amendment to when "necessary to 
achieve a compelling interest."42 Earlier versions of the 
proposed amendment empowered both the states and 
Congress to enforce the article, as well as to enact 
exceptions "required for compelling reasons of public safety 
or for judicial efficiency in mass victim cases."43 The 
. current version limits the power of enforcement to 
legislation by Congress, and is silent on the appropriate 
legislative body to enact exceptions to the article. 
Sections four and five address the amendment's 
relevance.44 The rights conferred in the proposed 
amendment are applicable to federal, state, District of 
Columbia, and other territorial proceedings.45 These 
proceedings are deemed to include rnilitary and juvenile 
proceedings.46 
m. STATE VICTIMS' RIGHTS AMENDMENTS 
A. A Comparative Analysis of State Victims' Rights 
Amendments 
While the federal government continues to consider 
a constitutional amendment, many states already have 
adopted constitutional amendments providing rights to 
victims of crime. In 1982, California became the first state 
to adopt a constitutional amendment providing rights to 
40See id. 
4·See id. at § 3. 
421d. 
43S.1. Res. 6, I05th Cong., 1st Session § 3 (Jan. 21,1997). 
"See S.1. Res. 3, I06th Congo §§ 4-5 (1999). 
4'See id. 
46See id. 
30.1 U. Bait L.F. 48 
crime victims.47 California's amendment is narrow in 
scope, simply providing victims with the right to restitution, 48 
that relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal 
proceeding,49 and that ajudge shall consider public safety 
when setting bail amounts. 50 
Four years after California adopted its VRA, Rhode 
Island became the second state to adopt a constitutional 
amendment providing rights to crime victims. 51 Rhode 
Island's amendment is also comparatively narrow in scope, 
providing crime victims the "right to be treated by agents 
of the state with dignity, respect and sensi,tivity during all 
phases of the criminal justice process. "52 The amendment 
further provides restitution and the right to address the 
court at sentencing regarding the impact of the crime on 
the victim.53 
Thereafter, four other states adopted VRAs in the 
1980s·: Florida, 54 Michigan,55 Texas,56 and Washington.57 
With these new amendments also came new rights afforded 
to crime victims. The Michigan amendment, for example, 
provided nine enumerated rights to the crime victim: (1) to 
be treated with fairness and respect; (2) to timely 
disposition of the case; (3) to be reasonably protected 
from the accused; (4) to notification of proceedings; (5) 
to attend proceedings; (6) to confer with the prosecution; 
(7) to make a statement at sentencing; (8) to restitution; 
47See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28. 
4BSee id. at § 28(b). 
49See id at § 28(d). The language of the amendment empowers the 
legislature to enact statutory exceptions. See id 
'OSee id. at § 28(e). 
'·See R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23. 
521d. 
nSee id 
"See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16. 
"See MICH. CoNST. art. I, § 24. 
56See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30. 
'7See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 35. 
and (9) to information about the conviction, sentence, 
imprisonment, and release of the accused.58 
From these initial state amendments, the momentum 
of state VRA adoption gradually increased during the 
1990s. Arizona passed a VRA in 1990, and New Jersey 
followed in 1991.59 Between 1992 and 1994 eleven states 
enacted VRAs,f,o and eight additional states passed VRAs 
in 1996.61 Today, the majority of states have adopted 
VRAS.62 
Despite the increasing number of states with VRAs, 
the existing VRAs vary widely in strength and scope.63 
The most common rights afforded crime victims in the state 
amendments are the right to notification of proceedings 
and the right to attend proceedings.64 These two rights 
"See MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24. 
'9See infra Appendix A. 
6O'fhe eleven states adopting constitutional amendments between 1992 
and1994 were: Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, 
Maryland, Missouri, Ohio, Utah, and Wisconsin. See id. 
61The eight states adopting constitutional amendments in 1996 were: 
Connecticut, Indiana, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South 
Carolina, and Virginia. See id 
6lSee id While Montana does not have a constitutional amendment 
analogous to these states, in November 1998, Montana voters approved 
a more limited constitutional amendment that broadens the state's criminal 
justice system to include restitution to the crime victim. See Mo. CONST. 
art. I, § 32 (1992). 
Additionally, Oregon voters ratified a crime victims' rights 
amendment to the state constitution in 1996. See OR; CONST. art. I, § 42 
(1996). The Oregon VRA was the most comprehensive of any of the 
state amendments, providing 14 enumerated rights for crime victims. See 
id. In 1998, however, the Oregon Supreme Court invalidated the 
amendment on the ground that it combined several distinct constitutional 
amendments that should have been voted on separately under the state's 
constitutional provisions governing amendments through an initiative 
petition. See Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 959 P.2d 49 (Or. 1998). 
In addition to Montana and Oregon, the remaining states without 
a state constitutional amendment that provides victims' rights are: 
Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, 
South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 
63 See Appendix B (providing a state-by-state index of crime victim rights). 
MSee id. 
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are, however, limited by language in some of the 
amendments. In some state amendments, a crime victim 
has constitutional rights to the extent that those rights do 
not interfere with the constitutional rights of the defendant 
Other state amendments afford crime victims the right to 
attend proceedings, but limit this right by requiring that 
victims not be a material witness in the matter. 
Another right, afforded in varying degrees by twenty-
five of the state amendments, is the right to be heard at 
proceedings.6S This right primarily refers to victim-impact 
testimony or testimony at sentencing. Sixty-four percent 
of the state amendments give victims a constitutional right 
to be treated with fairness, dignity and respect 66 
Several provisions appear in over one-third of the 
VRAs. One of these is the right of crime victims to be 
informed of their rights.67 A second provision provides 
victims with the right to be protected from the accused.68 
In addition, more than one-half of the VRAs provide one 
or more of the following rights: to confer with the 
prosecutor, to restitution, to be protected from the accused, 
to a speedy disposition, and to notice of the sentence, 
release, or escape of the perpetrator. 69 
Other rights are less pervasive in the various state 
VRAs. VRAs in only five states-Alaska, Idaho, 
Missouri, South Carolina, and Utah-provide some rights 
or authorize the legislature to extend victims' rights at the 
juvenile level. Only three state V~Arizona, Idaho, 
and Louisiana---provide a crime victim the right to refuse 
an interview related to the crime and initiated by the 
defense.7o New Mexico provides victims with the 
constitutional right to ''have the prosecuting attorney notify 
the victim's employer, if requested by the victim, of the 
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court proceeding that may necessitate the absence of the 
victim from work for good cause. ''71 
The actual terms of the VRAs tend to either be short, 
broad versions of the intended language or detailed 
enumerations of an individual's rights.72 For instance, 
Florida's amendment simply states that victims are "entitled 
to the right to be infonned, to be present, and to be heard 
when relevant, at all crucial stages of the criminal 
proceedings, to the extent that these rights do not interfere 
. with the constitutional rights of the accused.''73 Similarly, 
Colorado's amendment states that victims "have the right 
to be heard when relevant, infonned, and present at all 
critical stages of the criminal justice process."74 On the 
other end of the spectrum are amendments in Arizona and 
. South Carolina that each enumerate twelve specific rights 
of crime victims.75 
Half of the state amendments are silent on the 
question of enforcement.76 Another third provide that a 
violation of the rights shall not be a cause for civil damages, 
but do not preclude actions for inj~ctive relief. 77 There 
are a variety of approaches to enforcement and limitations 
on the remedies provided victims. The Texas VRA 
specifically forbids a victim standing as a party in a criminal 
proceeding, and denies the right to contest the disposition 
of any charge.78 The Maryland VRA prohibits the victim 
from being able to stay a criminal justice proceeding.79 
7IN.M. CONST. art. II, § 24(10). 
72See NATIONAL VICTIM CENTER, THE 1996 VICTIMS' RIGIfI'S SOURCEBOOK: A 
CoMPILATION AND COMPARISON OF VICTIMS' RIGlITS LAWS (1996) (providing 
a state-by-state index of enforcement language or restrictions in the state 
constitutional amendments). 
73FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b). 
74COU>. CONST. art. II, § 16a. 
7' See ARIz. CONST.art. II, § 2.1; S.C. CONST., art. I, § 24. 
76See NATIONAL VICTIM CENTER, supra note 72. 
77See id. 
78See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(5)(e). 
79See MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 47(c). 
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The Ohio VRA is more general and "does not confer upon 
any person a right to appeal or modify any decision in a 
criminal proceeding."80 The VRAs for Idaho, Illinois, 
Kansas, Missouri, and New Mexico, although silent as to 
a victim's standing, contain language limiting the impact of 
the VRA on the disposition of cases. 81 
B. Appellate Interpretation of State Victims' Rights 
Amendments 
To understand the potential interpretations and 
implications of the language in the proJX>sed federal VRA, 
it is helpful to consider how state appellate courts have 
interpreted VRAs. This section considers relevant state 
appellate court interpretations oflanguage in state VRAs 
similar to the proposed federal constitutional amendment 82 
In addition, other issues confronted in interpreting state 
VRAs are discussed including various state appellate cowt 
decisions that construe the definition of a victim. Also 
examined are decisions considering the appropriate result 
when a victim's constitutional rights conflict with a 
defendant's constitutional rights. 
The proposed federal amendment includes eight 
rights for crime victims: (1) the right to "reasonable notice" 
of public proceedings relating to the crime; (2) the right 
not to be excluded from public proceedings; (3) the right 
to be heard during proceedings to determine conditional 
release, acceptance of a negotiated plea and sentence, 
and parole proceedings; (4) the right to notice of release 
or escape from custody; (5) the right to be free from 
unreasonable delay; (6) the right to an order of restitution; 
(7) the right to have safety considered in detennining 
conditional release from custody; and (8) the right to 
"reasonable noti~" of these rights. The interpretation of 
each of these proposed rights under analogous state VRA 
provisions is analyzed in this section. 
&OOIllO. CONST. art. I, § lO(a). 
81See IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22(10); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8. I (1O)(d); fUN. 
CONST. art. 15, § IS(c); Mo. CONST. art. I, § 3(4); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 
24(B). 
I2The scope of consideration in this section is limited to state appellate 
court decisions promulgated under a state VRA, and does not include 
decisions decided under implementing statutes for the VRAs. 
1. The right to "reasonable notice" of public 
proceedings relating to the crime 
The first right of a crime victim in the proposed federal 
amendment is the right "to reasonable notice of ... any 
public proceedings relating to the crime."83 The right of 
the crime victim to be notified of proceedings involving his 
or her case is found in nearly every state constitutional 
amendment. 84 Several cases have interpreted the victim's 
right to be notified of proceedings involving the victim's 
case. In People v. Superior Court,8S the Court of Appeal 
of California held that the failure of a probation officer to 
comply with that officer's duty to notify the crime victim 
of the probation and sentencing hearing did not deprive 
the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed.86 
In State v. Holt,87 a Kansas court considered 
whether, under the Kansas state VRA, a crime victim is 
entitled to notice when a district court grants parole to a 
defendant convicted of a misdemeanor who has partially 
served the sentence.88 The Supreme Court of Kansas 
held that the granting of parole to such a defendant was at 
the discretion of the trial court; therefore, crime victims 
did not have the right to be notified when the trial court 
determined, sua sponte, to grant parole to the defendant 89 
Although the Kansas Constitution provides crime victims 
with "the right to be informed of and to be present at public 
hearings,''90 in considering the appeal, the court noted that 
the implementing statutes to the state VRA lacked "any 
mandatory rights for crime victims, and the provisions are 
merely directive orperrnissive [and] there are no provisions 
IJS.J. Res. 3 § I, 106th Congo (1999). 
84For a chart illustrating the states that afford the right to be notified of 
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for enforcement of the suggested rights and no sanctions 
imposed if they are not followed. "91 The court found that 
a public hearing for the purpose of granting parole to a 
misdemeanor defendant who has served a portion of the 
sentence was not purely discretionary and that no abuse 
of discretion had been shown.92 In dicta; the court 
encouraged trial courts in cases involving parole to 
"carefully consider holding a public hearing and notifying 
crime victims in cases where the court deems it advisable 
and when it can be accomplished without undue burden 
on the judicial system. ''93 
In 1998, the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
considered whether a cause of action for monetary 
damages accrues against the state or its officers when there 
is a failure to notify the crime victims of their constitutional 
rights.94 The court found that crime victims could not sue 
the state in an effort to compel the state to inform them of 
their rights.9s In Bandoni v. State ,96 the victims were 
injured after being hit by a drunk driver.97 The victims 
requested the state to update them on the criminal case 
against the driver.98 The defendant was permitted to plead 
no contest to a lesser charge without the victims' 
knowledge.99 Thereafter, the victims brought action against 
the state for failure to advise them of their rights as crime 
victims contrary to the Rhode Island VRA and Victim's 
Bill ofRights.1°O The victims alleged a negligence theory 
against the state for failure to notify them of the pending 
criminal case and demanded monetary damages under the 
91See id. at 1186 (referring to KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7333(a)(1994». 
92See id. at 1187. 
931d. at 1188. 
proceedings, see Appendix B. . 94See Bandoni V. State, 715 A.2d 580 (R.I. 1998). 
·'202 Cal. Rptr. 585 (Ct. App. 1984). 9'See id. at 601. 
86See id at 586-87. 96See id. at 583 . 
• 7847 P.2d 1I83 (Kan. 1994). 97See id. 
IISee id. at 1186. 91See id. 
I9See id. at 1187. 99See id. 
9OSee id. at 1185 (quotingKAN. CONST. art. 15, § \5(a». lOoSee id. 
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state VRA.IOI The trial judge dismissed the action for 
failme to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 102 
The appellate court declined to recognize either claim and 
found that there was no action for negligence arising from 
the Victim's Bill of Rights. 103 The court further held that 
the VRA was not self-executing, and "[did] not provide a 
sufficient rule by which the rights given may be enjoyed or 
protected. "104 In so holding, the court stated that the cause 
of action "must arise from the floor of the General Assembly 
and not from the bench of the supreme court. "IOS 
Significantly~ none of the VRAs, including the 
proposed federal VRA, provide a cause of action for 
damages in the event that officials who are charged with 
informing crime victims of their rights fail to provide such 
notice. Like the proposed federal amendment, 
approximately one-half of the states have VRAs providing 
that an official's noncompliance will not result in a cause 
of action for damages or the right to vacate an otherwise 
lawful conviction 106 The remaining states have VRAs that 
are silent on the matter or empower the legislature to enact 
enforcement provisions. IO? 
2 .. The right not to be excluded from any public 
proceedings 
Twenty-six state amendments include the right of 
victims to attend proceedings. lOS This right, however, is 
not unifonn among state VRAs. Instead, the right to attend 
proceedings is granted in different degrees using varying 
language. In particular, some of the state VRAs do not 
IOISee id at 582. 
I02See id. at 583. 
103See id. at 584. 
I04Id. at 589. 
10' Id at 596. 
I06See NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8(3); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28(2). 
I07See MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24(2); NEB. CoNST. art. I, § 28. 
10000r a table indicating which states provide specific rights, including 
refer to the right in the negative sense, "not to be excluded;" 
rather these state VRAs provide the affirmative right to 
attend proceedings. Appeals based on this right typically 
take the fonn of a defendant claiming that the victim's 
presence at the proceeding interfered with the right to a 
fair trial. Several state appellate courts have considered a 
victim's constitutional right to be present at proceedings 
related to the crime.109 
In State v. Beltran-Feliz, 110 the Supreme Court of 
Utah held that a victim exercising her state constitutional 
right to be present during the trial did not violate a 
defendant's rights under the FifthAmendrnent of the United 
States Constitution. III The Utah Constitution provides 
that a victim has the right "[ u ]pon request to be infonned 
of, be present at, and to be heard at important criminal 
justice hearings related to the victim, either in person or 
through a lawful representative, once a criminal infonnation 
or indictment charging a crime has been publicly filed in 
court .... "112 State legislation further articulated the 
victim's right not to be excluded from trial. I 13 On appeal, 
the defendant contended that the combination of the victim's 
presence in the courtroom, the victim's testimony as the 
last witness for the State, and a reference to the victim by 
the prosecutor as "our victim," had the cumulative effect 
of denying the defendant a fair trial. I 14 
The court in Beltran-Feliz held that to sustain this 
constitutional challenge, the defendant had the burden of 
proving that he was denied a fair trial, and must "show 
I09Although not a state appellate court case, the "Oklahoma City 
Bombing" case dealt with mass tort victims seeking to be present at trial 
without being barred from giving victim-impact testimony at sentencing. 
See United States v. McVeigh, 958 F. Supp. 512 (D. Colo. 1997). For 
discussion of the quest of these victims to be present at the trial, their 
subsequent denial to be present, and other implications relevant to the 
proposed federal VRA, see The Rights a/Crime Victims: Hearings on 
S.J. Res. 44 Be/ore the Senate Committee on the JudiCiary, 106th Congo 
(1997) (statement of Paul G. Cassell, Professor of Law, University of 
Utah College of Law). 
11°922 P.2d 30 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
IIISee id at 35. 
112See id at 32-33 (quoting UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28(b». 
1I3See id at 33 (quoting UTAH CoOE ANN. §§ 77-38-4(1) & 77-38-2(5)(e». 
the right of victims to attend proceedings, see Appendix B. 114See id at 32-34. 
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more than the mere possibility that [the victim] confonned 
her testimony to that of other witnesses."115 The court 
found that the defendant's assertion, based only on a single 
reference that the victim's testimony was tailored in what 
was not suggested to be a critical element ofthe case, 
was insufficient to meet the burden of proving the defendant 
was prejudiced by the victim's rights. 116 
The Arizona Supreme Court has also considered a 
victim's exercise of the right to be present at jury selection. 
In State v. Gonzales, 117 the court held the presence of 
victim of aggravated assault and armed robbery in a 
courtroom duringjury selection did not prejudice or deny 
the defendant's right to a fair trial. I 18 The court recognized 
that the victim had a constitutional right to attend all of the 
same criminal proceedings that the defendant had a right 
to attend. 119 The court also noted that there was no 
evidence that prospective jurors noticed the victim or knew 
who she was during jury selection. 120 
Florida's appellate courts have considered a victim's 
right not to be excluded from proceedings on several 
occasions. In Bellamy v. State,t21 the defendant in a 
sexual battery prosecution claimed that his accuser could 
not be classified as a "victim" where the jury was not made 
aware that the accuser was declared a "victim" under the 
VRA amendment. 122 The court held that because the State 
did not attempt to call the accuser as a rebuttal witness, 
IIlSee id. at 35. 
116See id. at 34. In dicta, the court expressed concern that its decision 
"may give rise to constitutional challenge every time a victim is allowed 
to remain in the courtroom during a criminal trial." Jd. at 35 n.6. To avoid 
this effect, the court reiterated that inconsistent statements by a witness 
or victim is an issue of credibility for the fact finder to consider, and 
under state precedent there have been numerous findings of no prejudice 
in allowing a victim to remain present throughout the trial even ifhe or 
she later testifies. See id. 
117 892 P.2d 838 (Ariz. 1995). 
IIRSee id. at 848. 
119See id. (citing ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 2.1 (A)(3». 
120See id. at 848-49. 
121 594 So. 2d 337 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). 
I22See id. at 338. 
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and because the accuser did not display any emotion or 
otherwise draw attention to herselfwhile sitting in the 
courtroom, the Florida VRA did not destroy the 
defendant's presumption of innocence, or otherwise 
prejudice the jury against the defendant. 123 
In Gore v. Florida, 124 a defendant was convicted of 
first-degree murder and sentenced to death.125 The 
defendant appealed the trial court's decision on the ground 
that the court erred in excusing the victim's stepmother 
from the rule of witness sequestration because she was a 
relative of the victim. 126 The court determined that the 
presence of the victim's stepmother in the courtroom during 
the trial did not prejudice the defendant in this case. 127 
Notwithstanding, the court cautioned, "while in general 
relatives of homicide victims have the right to be present 
at trial, this right must yield to the defendant's right to a fair 
trial."128 
After Gore, the Florida Supreme Court heard 
Martinez v. Florida,129 in which a defendant appealed 
his conviction on the grounds that the victim's constitutional 
right to be present conflicted with his right to a fair trial by 
having the witness sequestered. The court held that the 
victim should not have been permitted in the courtroom 
during opening statements. 130 Nevertheless, the court found 
this was a harmless error and affirmed the defendant's 
conviction. J3J 
I23See id. 
124599 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1992). 
mSee id. 
126See FLA. CONST. art. I, § l6(b) (affording next of kin of homicide 
victims "the right to be informed, to be present, and to be heard when 
relevant, at all crucial stages of criminal proceedings, to the extent that 
these rights do not interfere with the constitutional rights of the accused' 
(emphasis added». 
I27See Gore, 599 So. 2d at 986. 
128Jd. at 985-86. 
129664 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. 1996). 
1311See id. at 1035. 
I3ISee id. at 1036. 
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3. The right to be heard 
The right to be heard under the proposed federal 
amendment includes the right to be heard, if present, at a 
"proceeding to detennine conditional release, acceptance 
of a negotiated plea, or a sentence ... [and] at a parole 
proceeding that is not public, to the extent [] afforded to 
the offender."132 Most state VRAs provide victims the 
right to be heard in criminal proceedings, particularly at 
sentencing hearings. \33 This right typically is exercised via 
oral or written victim-impact statements presented at 
sentencing. 134 
In 1991, the United States Supreme Court addressed 
the use of victim-impact statements in capital sentencing. 
Although the Court in Payne v. Tennessee, 135 did not 
consider a state constitutional amendment, its ruling has 
been significant in a number of subsequent state-appellate 
court cases addressing VRAs and victim-impact 
evidence. 136 In Payne, the United States Supreme Court 
held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, does 
not bar "the admission of victim-impact evidence during 
, the penalty phase ofa trial." 137 This holding specifically 
I32S.1. Res. 3 § I. 
I33See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2. I (A)(4); COLO. 
CONST. art. II, § 16(a); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 
22(b); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8. I (a)(4); KAN. CaNST. art. 15, § 15(a); MD. 
DECL. OFRIOlITS art. 47(b); MICH. CaNST. art. I, § 47(b); Mo. CaNST. art. I, 
§ 32(1)(2); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24(A)(7); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23; UTAH 
CONST. art. I, § 28(1)(b); WASH. CaNST. art. I, § 35; WIS. CaNST. art. I, § 
9(m). 
1J.4Whether victim-impact statements should be admitted during capital 
sentencing is a very controversial issue, producing considerable scholarly 
debate, but is not within the scope of this article. 
135501 U.S. 808 (1991)( overruling the Court's earlier decisions in Booth 
v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (I 987)(holding by a 5-4 majority that victim-
impact evidence was inadmissible at capital sentencing»; see also South 
Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989) (holding by a 5-4 majority that 
evidence concerning victims in the sentencing phase of a capital case was 
inadmissible). 
136See supra notes 60 to 84 and accompanying text. 
137Payne, 501 U.S. at 811. 
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relates to the use of victim-impact evidence at the 
sentencing phase of a capital crime.138 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, traced the historical 
development of criminal sentencing philosophy, and noted 
that most of the states had approved admitting victim-
impact statements at sentencing. 139 Payne resulted in an 
elimination of the constitutional bar to victim-impact 
statements in death-penalty cases. Consequently, Payne 
has allowed state courts to uphold victim-impact statement 
language in state constitutions and statutes. 
i. Victim-impact evidence in state appellate courts 
after Payne 
In view of the Supreme Court's holding in Payne, 
state appellate courts have consistently rejected defendant 
claims of due process, equal protection, right to 
confrontation, and cruel and unusual punishment violations 
in capital-sentencing cases where victims were permitted 
to introduce victim-impact evidence. 
In State v. Gentry, 140 the Washington Supreme Court 
became the first state appellate court to consider victim-
impact evidence while taking into account the holding in 
Payne and the Washington VRA.141 The court in Gentry 
found that the state constitutional rights of a victim in 
criminal cases under the Washington VRA must be 
harmonized with a defendant's rights, including due 
process rights during the sentencing phase of trial. 142 The 
court acknowledged the "potential tension between the 
139See id. at 820-21. 
14
°888 P.2d 1105 (Wash. 1995). 
141In State v. Maxwell, 647 So. 2d 871 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994), the 
Florida District Court of Appeals responded to a certified question 
about the constitutionality of a state statute admitting victim-impact 
evidence in a felony sentencing. The court briefly discussed Payne and 
the state's victim's rights constitutional amendment in upholding the use 
of the statute. It held that victim-impact evidence may be admitted 
because "such evidence is relevant in sentencing, as it informs the jury . 
.. of the particular harm caused." [d. at 872. 
142See Gentry, 888 P.2d at 1138. 
due process rights of the capital case Defendant" and the 
victim's rights that are created by the VRA.143 Despite 
this tension between rights, the court held that victim-impact 
evidence was admissible at a proceeding considering death 
sentencing. l44 The court in Gentry explicitly limited its 
holding to the admissibility of victim-impact evidence in 
the sentencing phase of capital cases. 145 
Subsequent to the holdings in Payne and Gentry, 
other states also considered the admissibility of victim-
impact statements. In Kansas v. Gideon, 146 the Supreme 
Court of Kansas held that when victim-impact statements 
are made to a judge, not a jury, the victim's right to make 
a statement at a sentencing proceeding under the state's 
VRA did not violate the defendant's constitutional right to 
confrontation, equal protection, or due process.147 At 
trial, over the objection of the defendant, the deceased 
victim's family made statements regarding how the victim's 
death had affected them.148 On appeal, the defendant 
argued that a sentence was imposed "under the influence 
of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factors."149 The 
court held that although the trial court had mentioned the 
family's statements before sentencing, this did not 
1 43Id. 
I«See id. at I 14 I (stating that "the categories of evidence which are 
admissible at a death sentencing proceeding can be expanded to include 
victim-impact evidence"). In dicta, the court cautioned, that "[b ]ecause 
we conclude that victim-impact statements do not per se violate the 
Washington Constitution, this does not mean that any and all such 
evidence is admissible." Id. at 1142. 
14'See id. at 1142 (indicating that trial courts should exercise discretion in 
deciding the scope of permissible victim-impact testimony on a case-
by-case basis). 
146894 P.2d 850 (Kan. 1995). 
147See generally Shannon E. Giles. Victim-Impact Evidence and Sentencing 
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demonstrate improper consideration of the victim's 
statements. ISO 
In State v. Muhammad,lsl the New Jersey Supreme 
Court reversed the lower court's denial of a victim's right 
to be heard at the sentencing hearing for a defendant 
charged with kidnapping, rape, and murder. Unlike 
Washington's VRA, the New Jersey VRA did not 
specifically allow for victim-impact statements at 
sentencing hearings. 152 As such, the court relied on Payne, 
the New Jersey VRA, and enabling legislation, which 
mandated that such statements could be admitted under 
certain circumstances. 153 The court noted that "[i]n the 
absence of the Victim's Rights Amendment, we might have 
continued to hold that victim-impact evidence should not 
be admitted during the sentencing phase of a capital case. 
However, the electorate, by passing the Victim's Rights 
Amendment ... have mandated that victim-impact 
evidence be admitted. "154 
Similarly, Arizona courts have held thatajudge's 
decision to impose the death penalty is not affected by 
UnSee id at 864. The court cautioned that: 
Id. 
When victims' statements are presented to ajury, the trial 
court should exercise control. Control can be exercised, for 
example, by requiring the victim's statements to be in question 
and answer form or submitted in writing in advance. The 
victim's statement should be directed toward information 
concerning the victim and the impact the crime has had on a 
victim and the victim's family. Allowing the statement to 
range far afield may result in reversible error. 
for Premeditated Murder in Kansas. 42 KAN. L. REv. 55, 72 (19?4) m678 A.2d 164 (N.J. 1996). 
(providing analysis of the requirements in Kansas for victim-impact 
testimony). mSee N.J. CONST. art. I, § 22. 
148Gideon, 894 P.2d at 862-63. mSee N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 11-3(c)(6) (West Supp. 1997). 
149Id. at 864. 1'4Muhammad. 678 A.2d at 174-75. 
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victim-impact evidence. I ss In State v. Mann, IS6 victim-
impact evidence was allowed to rebut a capital-murder 
defendant's mitigation evidence. The record did not 
indicate that the sentencingjudge improperly gave weight 
to the opinions of the victim's immediate family members 
that the death penalty should be imposed.ls7 The 
sentencing judge stated that the finding of aggravating 
circumstances was based solely on evidence adduced at 
trial, and that he understood the family's feelings. IS8 In 
upholding the decision in Mann, the Arizona Supreme 
Court endorsed the use of victim-impact evidence in capital 
sentencing. 
ii. Sentence recommendations by crime victims 
The Supreme Court in Payne made a distinction 
between victim-impact evidence "concerning a murder 
victim's personal characteristics or the impact of the crime 
on the victim's family and community," and victim-impact 
evidence providing the "opinions of the victim's family about 
the crime, the defendant and the appropriate sentence. "IS9 
The Court did not address the issue of the constitutionality 
of a sentence recommendation by a victim ina death penalty 
case. Likewise, the state courts discussed above 
distinguished between the two types of statements, 
specifically approving descriptions of the impact of the 
crime on the victim's family. 160 
ISSSee State v. Mann, 934 P.2d 784 (1997); see also State v. Gonzales, 
892 P.2d 838 (Ariz. I 995)(holding that a capital murder defendant failed 
to establish that aggravated assault victim's recommendation that 
defendant receive death penalty affected sentencing decision); State v. 
Gulbrandson, 906 P.2d 579 (Ariz. I 995)(stating that in capital cases the 
admission of statements of the victim's family regarding impact of crime 
did not violate constitutional rights of defendant convicted offirst-degree 
murder and did not require vacating a death sentence; and noting that 
there was nothing in the record to indicate that trial judge, in determining 
sentence, gave weight to the victim's family's statements). 
IS6See id. 
IS7See Mann, 934 P.2d at 788. 
ISBSee id. 
IS9Payne, 501 U.S. at 832-33 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
I60See. e.g.. Gentry, 888 P.2d at 1140. 
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In State v. Heath, 161 the Kansas Court of Appeals 
approved the use of a sentencing request by the victim's 
family. In Heath, the defendant, who was accused of 
driving while intoxicated, pled "no contest" to a charge of 
involuntary manslaughter.162 State sentencing guidelines 
called for a presumptive prison term of up to five years, 
but the trial judge placed the defendant on five-years 
probation.163 The court's decision to reduce the sentence 
was influenced by the urging of the victim's father. 164 
Similarly, in Salt Lake Cityv. Johnson,16S the Court 
of Appeals of Utah held that the trial court had authority 
to dismiss a domestic violence charge at the victim's 
request. 166 In another case regarding sentence 
recommendations by victims, the Missouri Court of 
Appeals in Sharp v. State,167 held that a victim was 
permitted to make a sentencing recommendation despite 
the public prosecutor's plea agreement with the defendant 
not to recommend a sentence. 168 
4. The right to notice of release or escape from 
custody 
The proposed federal amendment and seventeen 
states provide the right to notice of sentence, release, or 
escape from custody.169 Currently, no state appellate cases 
have substantially considered this constitutional right of 
crime victims. 
16190 I P.2d 29 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996). 
162See id. at 31. 
163See id. 
164See id. at 31-32. 
II,S959 P.2d 1022 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
I66See id. (citing UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.7 
(Supp. 1997) (allowing a trial court to dismiss charges of domestic violence 
"at the request ofthe victim if the court has reasonable cause to believe 
that the dismissal would benefit the victim"». 
167908 S.W.2d 752 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). 
16BSee id. at 755. 
169For a table designating rights provided by each state VRA, including 
the right to notice of sentence, release, or escape from custody, see 
Appendix B. 
5. The right to be free from unreasonable delay 
The proposed federal amendment and twelve states 
provide the victim with the right to be free from 
unreasonable delay. This right can be analogized to a 
defendant's right to a speedy trial. While much case law 
has developed interpreting a defendant's right to a speedy 
trial, no state appellate courts have decided issues 
regarding a victim's right to be free from unreasonable 
delay. 
6. The right to an order of restitution 
Nineteen states provide the right to an order of 
restitution in their VRAs. Appellate courts in Arizona and 
Michigan have considered this right. In State ex rei. 
McDougall v. Superior Court In and For County of 
Maricopa,170 the Court of Appeals of Arizona held that a 
motorist, who pled guilty t~ leaving the scene of an 
automobile accident involving injury, could not be ordered 
to pay restitution for injuries resulting from the underlying 
accident where none of the injuries for which the state 
sought restitution was caused by motorist's criminal 
conduct of leaving the scene of accident. The Arizona 
Constitution provides victims with a right to restitution. 
Under article 2, section 2.1 (A)(8), crime victims have a 
right to "receive prompt restitution from the person or 
persons convicted of the criminal conduct that caused the 
victim's loss or injury ."171 According to the court, the plain 
language of the constitutional provision ''requires restitution 
only for losses caused by the criminal conduct for which 
[the] defendant was convicted."I72 Because the injuries 
for which restitution was sought involved the violation of a 
. civil traffic offense, restitution was not warranted. 
In People v. Peters,173 the Supreme Court of 
Michigan also considered a crime victim's constitutional 
right to restitution. In Peters, the trial court entered a 
restitution order under authority of the Michigan VRA. 
17°920 P.2d 784 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). 
171ARIZ. CONST. art. II § 2.l(A)(8). 
inState ex rei. McDougall, 920 P.2d at 786. 
173537 N. W.2d 160 (Mich. 1995). 
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of Michigan considered 
whether an order of restitution should abate where a 
convicted criminal defendant died pending appeal of his 
conviction.174 The court reasoned that because the 
provision of the Michigan VRA providing crime victims 
the right to an order of restitution was primarily intended 
to compensate crime victims, rather than penalize a 
defendant, a restitution order should be enforced after a 
defendant's death.175 The restitution amount approximated 
losses incurred by the city fire department and amounts 
paid by defendant's insurer as a result of twenty-five fires 
in which arson was suspected, and the restitution order 
was entered under authority of the Michigan VRA and 
Crime Victim's Rights Act. 176 The court distinguished 
between an instance where a defendant dies pending an 
appeal of a criminal conviction, and the status of fines, 
penalties, and orders that may accompany a criminal 
conviction. 177 The court held that where the intent behind 
a fine or order is to compensate the victim, the fine or 
order may survive the death of the offender.178 
7. The right to consideration of safety of victim in 
determining conditional release 
Ten states provide crime victims the constitutional 
right to be protected from the accused. Not all of these 
states consider safety in determining conditional release. 
To date, no state court opinions have directly interpreted 
this constitutional right 
17·See id. at 161. 
I75See id. at 167. 
176See MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24(1); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 
780.766(2)(West 1995). 
I77See Peters. 537 N. W.2d at 167. 
I7ISee id. 
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8. The right to reasonable notice of rights 
Ten states provide crime victims the constitutional 
right to be informed of their rights. I 79 ArizDna's intennediate 
appellate court considered the state's failure to inform a 
victim ofherconstitutional rights as provided by the ArizDna 
constitution.180 In State ex. rei. Hance v. Arizona Board 
of Pardons & Paroles, a rape victim brought a petition 
before the Court of Appeals of Arizona requesting that 
the court vacate an order by the Arizona Board of Pardon 
and Paroles (the "Board") releasing a prisoner. 181 The 
victim complained that she did not receive prior notice of 
either the parole hearing or her constitutional rights. 182 The 
Board had sent notice of the first parole hearing, however, 
the notice was sent to the victim's last known address and 
was returned as undeliverable. 183 No additional efforts 
were made to contact the victim and when the prisoner 
was released eight years after the initial hearing, the victim 
sued the Board. 184 In addition to not receiving proper 
notice of the hearing, the ''victim was never informed of 
her constitutional right to request notice of and to 
participate in post-conviction release proceedings."18S 
The Arizona Constitution provides that crime victims 
have the right "to be present at and, upon request, to be 
informed of all criminal proceedings where the defendant 
has a right to be present," as well as t~e right "[t]o be 
heard at any proceedings involving a post-arrest release 
decision, a negotiated plea, and sentencing."186 In 
addition, the Arizona Constitution provides victims the right 
179See Appendix B. 
IIOSee State ex. reI. Hance v. Arizona Board of Pardons & Paroles, 875 
P.2d 824 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993). 
IIISee id. at 826. 
I12See id. 
II3See id. 
184See id. at 831. 
I15See id. at 830. 
1161d. at 829 (citing ARIZ. CONST. art 2, § 2. I (A)(3)-(4». 
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to be informed of their constitutional rights. 187 Pursuant to 
these constitutional provisions, the Arizona Court of 
Appeals acknowledged that the state has an affirmative 
obligation to inform victims of their state constitutional 
rights. l88 The court refused to allow the victim's failure to 
request notice of the proceedings, as required under 
implementing legislation, to serve as a defense because 
the victim was not first informed of her constitutional 
rights.189 In so holding, the court stated: 
The constitutional mandate is clear: victims must 
be informed of their rights. Armed with this 
knowledge, victims may choose to exercise 
these rights. Conversely, an uninformed victim 
may not exercise her rights because she is 
unaware of them, or unaware that the right to 
notice of a release hearing requires that she 
first file a request for such a notice. 190 
The court held that the failure to inform the victim of her 
constitutional right to request notice of and to participate 
in the proceedings violated her constitutional rights and 
rendered the release proceedings defective. 191 
In Hance, the court further found that the Board failed 
to make "reasonable efforts" to locate the rape victim. 192 
As a result, the victim's right to be informed of her state 
constitutional right to request notice of and to participate 
in the post-conviction proceedings concerning her attacker 
was violated.193 The Arizona Court of Appeals held that 
the Arizona Constitution protects a victim's due process 
rights,194 but due process requires only that efforts to 
I17See id. (citing ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(12». 




1925ee id. at 830-31. 
I93See id. at 830. 
I94See id. at 831 (citing ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 2.1(A». 
provide notice must be "reasonably calculated" to notify 
the individual.19s Under these circumstances, the court 
found thatthe Board not only had failed to make reasonable 
efforts to locate the victim, but also had made no efforts 
to locate the victim "since it sent a letter to her last known 
address in 1984, a decade after the conviction."196 
Although the Board asserted that it satisfied its obligation 
to notify the victim by notifying the county attorney of the 
upcoming hearings, the court failed to find that notifying 
the county attorney was sufficient to provide notice to the 
victim.l97 The cotnt in Hance held that, pursuant to AI'izDna 
statute, the appropriate remedy for the violation of the 
victim's right to notice of her constitutional rights was for 
the result of the release hearings to be set aside and have 
a new hearing ordered.198 
C. Appellate Interpretation of Crime Victim Attempts 
to Enforce State Constitutional Rights 
Section two of the proposed federal amendment 
states that standing to enforce the amendment is limited to 
"the victim or the victim's lawful representative. "199 In 
enforcement of victim's rights and standing, the differences 
in state court interpretations also appear to be a result of 
the differing language and limitations of each state's VRA. 
Appellate courts in Colorado, Texas, Arizona, and 
Rhode Island have specifically held that crime victims 
cannot achieve standing under their respective state VRA. 
In Gansz v. People,2°O the Colorado Supreme Court 
refused to allow a disgruntled crime victim to contest the 
19'5ee id. (quoting Matter of Gila River, 830 P.2d 442, 448 (Ariz. 1992) 




I91See id. at 831-32. 
I99S.1. Res. 3, 106th Congo § 2 (1999). 
200888 P.2d 256 (Colo. 1995). 
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dismissal of a case. In State ex. rei Hilbig v. 
McDonald,201 a Texas appellate court ruled that a crime 
victim lacked a constitutional right to review a prosecutor's 
file. In State v. Lamberton, 202 the Arizona Supreme Court 
held that the state VRA did not provide crime victims the 
right to file petitions for review in criminal cases. 
In Bandoni v. Rhode /sland,203 victims of an 
automobile accident caused by a drunk driver brought an 
action for alleged violations of the state VRA and Victims' 
Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held 
that there was no cause of action for negligence in tort 
arising from the Victim's Bill ofRights.204 Furthermore, 
the court refused to create a new cause of action.20s 
Therefore, there was no monetary award for failure to 
comply with the VRA because it failed to provide for a 
private cause of action.206 The court concluded that the 
state's VRA merely indicates principles, but lacks any rules 
by which to enforce those principles.207 
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in State of New 
Jersey in the Interest of K.P. D.o.B. 3131181,208 held 
that a victim had standing to oppose a petition by a 
newspaper to open a juvenile sexual assault trial.209 The 
court found that crime victims have an inalienable right to 
be present during a criminal proceeding subject only to 
rules concerning sequestration.210 
201839 S.W.2d 854, 856 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992). 
202899 P.2d 939 (Ariz. 1995). 
203715 A.2d 580 (R.1. 1998). 
204See id. 
2°'The court also held Rhode Island's VRA is not self-executing. See id. 
at 589. 
206See id. at 585-86. 
207See id. at 586. 
201See id. (citing N.J. CONST. art. I, § 22). 
209See State of New Jersey in the Interest ofK.P. D.O.B. 3/31181, 709 
A.2d315 (N.J. 1997). 
210See id. (citing N.J. CONST. art. I, § 22). 
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D. Other Issues Considered by Appellate Courts 
Interpreting Victim's Rights Amendments 
This section addresses state appellate court decisions 
considering the definition of a victim and the appropriate 
result when a conflict arises between the constitutional 
rights of both the victim and the defendant. 
1. Determining who is a victim 
The definition of''victim'' for most VRAs extends at 
least to the immediate family of the one who has been 
killed or is otherwise unable to speak. Some state 
appellate courts have interpreted this to include extended 
family, such as a sister-in-law. 21 1 
In Kansas v. Parks,212 the court held neither the 
state VRA, nor statutory bill of rights for crime victims, 
barred a murder victim's sister-in-law from submitting a 
victim-impact statement or from making a statement at 
the sentencing hearing. The court held that the VRA does 
not restrict the ability of non-victim and non-family 
members to testify and submit statements during the 
sentencing phase of criminal proceedings.213 The court 
noted that the purpose of the enactment is "to guarantee 
rights, not restrict rights. ''214 
In Statev. County of Maricopa, 21S the Supreme 
Court of Arizona held that the VRA does not require a 
victim to suffer personal injury in order to fall within 
definition of"crime victim." The court found that the owner 
and driver of an automobile damaged by an intoxicated 
driver qualified as a ''victim'' under the state's VRA, even 
though the owner was not injured.216 Similarly, in People 
2IISee Kansas v. Parks, 962 P.2d 486, 490 (Kan. 1998). 
v. Beck,217 the California appellate court held that the term 
''victims'' was not limited to natural persons. 
Arizona courts have also held a victim cannot be the 
"accused." The victim must be a victim as to the alleged 
criminal offense with which the defendant is charged.2IB 
In Knapp v. Martone,219 the Arizona Supreme Court held 
that the mother of two children alleged to have been 
murdered was a ''victim'' under the Victims' Bill ofRights. 
As a victim, the mother could properly refuse a request of 
the defendant, her husband, to depose her, even though 
the defendant was charged with murder.220 As an 
accessory, the mother was an unnamed and uncharged 
co-conspirator, but not an accused.221 Similarly, in 
Stapleford v. Houghton, 222 the Arizona Supreme Court 
held that a person is not a victim for the purposes of the 
state constitution's Victims' Bill of Rights if that person is 
in custody or is the accused. 
2. Balancing the rights of victims and defendants 
One of the more important observations about VRAs 
is its potential for victims' rights to encroach upon the well-
established constitutional rights of the criminal defendant. 
When faced with the issue, state appellate courts typically 
have sided with the countervailing rights of the defendant. 
In State v. Bible, 223 the Arizona Supreme Court held 
that victims of crime and their families have certain rights, 
but those rights do not, and must not, conflict with 
defendant's right to a fair trial. In Bible, the prosecutor 
indicated in closing argument that not only did the defendant 
have rights, such as the right to a fair trial, but the victim 
21721 Cal.Rptr.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1993). 
21BSee Knapp v. Martone, 823 P.2d 685 (Ariz. 1992); Stapleford v. 
mId. Houghton, 917 P.2d 703 (Ariz. 1996). 
213See id. (citing JUN. CONST. art. 15, § 15). 219823 P.2d 685 (Ariz. 1992). 
214Id. at 490. 220See id. at 686-87. 
215909 P.2d 476 (Ariz. 1996). 221See id. at 687. 
216See id. at 478 (holding that the owner and driver of an automobile 222917 P.2d 703 (Ariz. 1996). 
damaged in a collision with an intoxicated driver was a "victim" within 
meaning ofYRA, even though the owner was not physically injured). 223858 P.2d 1152 (Ariz. 1993). 
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also had rights under the Arizona VRA.224 The prosecutor 
further suggested that it was the jurors' duty to protect the 
rights of both the defendant and the victim.225 The court 
held that these comments, coupled with the prosecutor's 
opening statement that the goal of the trial was not 
necessarily to give the defendant a fair trial, but to do 
justice, were improper.226 
Similarly, the Arizona Supreme Court in Romley v. 
Superior Court in andfor County of Maricopa,227 found 
a direct conflict between a defendant's constitutional right 
to due process and the Victim's Bill of Rights. The court 
held that the due process clause of United States 
Constitution takes precedence over the provisions of a 
state constitution.228 In Romley, the defendant, relying upOn 
a justification defense, required access to medical records 
in order to cross-examine and impeach the victim.229 The 
court recognized the right of the victim to refuse a 
defendant's discovery request for medical records, 
however, the court held that when the information is 
exculpatory and essential to pre~tation of the defendant's 
defense, or is necessary for impeachment of the victim, 
then the right of the victim must fail.230 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Victim participation is an important element of our 
criminal justice system. We rely on victims to report the 
crime, testify, and facilitate prosecution. It is therefore 
reasonable that victims expect certain rights in the 
224See id. at 1205. 
mSee id. 
226See id. at 1206. 
227836 P.2d 445 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). 
22BSee id. at 449. 
229See id. at 447. 
230See id. at 452; see also State v. Superior Court in and for County of 
Maricopa, 836 P.2d 445 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that under 
certain circumstances, a defendant's right to gather exculpatory 
information can take precedence over the victim' s constitutional right to 
be left alone). But see State v. O'Neil, 836 P.2d 393 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1991) (holding victims' bill of rights abrogated the defendant's right to 
interview or otherwise seek discovery from unwilling victim). 
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prosecutorial process. The criminal justice system is 
beginning to recognize the necessity of treating crime 
victims with fairness, dignity, and respect 
Balancing the rights of victims with the rights of 
defendants has proved to be a challenge to our system of 
criminal justice and has stirred much debate. Although 
some of the rights afforded crime victims by state VRAs 
have not been difficult to enforce--such as the right of the 
victim to provide victim-impact testimony at sentencing-
upholding the rights of victims prior to the defendant's 
conviction presents a more serious challenge. For example, 
a jury may be unduly influenced by the victim's right to 
remain present during proceedings, or a defendant may 
be unjustly prejudiced by a victim's participation in the 
process. The rights of victims make it more difficult for 
the court to strike a fair balance between the defendant's 
right to a fair trial, and the victim's rights under a VRA. 
This difficulty undoubtedly has resulted in numerous 
appeals by defendants, a factor to be considered in any . 
judicial economy analysis. 
In view of the state appellate case law that has 
developed concerning the VRAs, problems have arisen 
that do not appear to be remedied in the drafting of the 
currently proposed federal VRA. As a practical matter, if 
a conflict arises, it is much easier for a judge to deny a 
victim his or her rights rather than provide a defendant an 
arguable issue to raise on appeal. Moreover, if the judge 
opts to deny the victim his or her state constitutional rights, 
it is difficult for the victim to obtain redress. A criminal 
defendant, however, who is denied his or her constitutional 
rights may have a conviction overturned or seek civil 
damages under civil rights law. No such remedies are 
provided to the victims of crime. Thus, the proposed federal 
constitutional amendment appears to fall victim to the 
problems suffered by its state counterparts, in that there is 
no legitimate enforcement mechanism; The proposed 
federal amendment explicitly limits the remedies provided, 
while establishing none. 
Notwithstanding the lack of an explicit enforcement 
mechanism, the case law that has developed under the 
state counterparts ofthe proposed federal VRA tend to 
reveal only limited problems with the enactment of such a 
Constitutional Amendment This SUlVey of case lawreveals 
that state appellate courts have addressed the largest fears 
of those opposing a federal VRA-that a defendant's 
30.1 U. Bait. LF. 61 
Articles 
rights will be hindered. When faced with legitimate 
conflicting rights, state appellate courts have consistently 
acknowledged that the liberty rights of defendants are 
paramount. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Amending the United States Constitution is a long 
and arduous process. Even if Congress approves the 
proposed amendment, ratification by three-fourths of the 
state legislatures within seven years is still required. In this 
country's history, it is rare that an issue has gamered enough 
support to warrant the substantial step of a Constitutional 
Amendment. Only time will tell if the political momentum 
of the modem victims' rights movement will endure to 
effectuate an amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States to protect the rights of crime victims. 
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APPENDIX A 
STATE VICTIMS' RIGHTS AMENDMENTS: 
ENACTMENT DATE AND PERCENTAGE OF 
ELECTORAL SUPPOR]"231 
State Year Passed Electoral SUQoort 
Alabama 1994 80% 
Alaska 1994 87% 
Arizona 1990 58% 
California 1982 56% 
Colorado 1992 86% 
Connecticut 1996 78% 
Florida 1988 90% 
Idaho 1994 79% 
Illinois 1992 77% 
Indiana 1996 89% 
Kansas 1992 84% 
Louisiana 1998 68% 
Maryland 1994 92% 
Michigan 1988 84% 
Mississippi 1998 93% 
Missouri 1992 84% 
Nebraska 1996 78% 
Nevada 1996 74% 
New Jersey 1991 85% 
New Mexico 1991 68% 
North Carolina 1996 78% 
Ohio 1994 77% 
Oklahoma 1996 91% 
Rhode Island 1986 Passed by Constitutional Convention 
South Carolina 1996 89% 
Tennessee 1998 89% 
Texas 1989 73% 
Utah 1994 68% 
Virginia 1996 84% 
Washington 1989 78% 
Wisconsin 1993 84% 
231See NATIONAL VICI1MS' CONsmunONAL AMENDMENT NElWORK. NVCAN 
BACKGROUND KIT, at 14 (April 1998). 
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APPENDIXB 
SUMMARY OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS 
: : 
Alabama • • 
.. 
• 2 
Alaska • • '. • • • 
,. 
• · ;. 11 
Arizona • • • • • • • • • • 
California • 
Colorado • • ." ~; 3 
Connecticut • • • •• • • · ' .. • 9 
Florida • • • 3 
Idaho •• '. • • • • ••• · ,.: 
11 
Illinois • • • • • • • • • 9 
Indiana •• • ' . • 4 
Kansas • • 3 
Louisiana • • • •• • • · ~ . • '. 11 Maryland '. • • • 5 Michigan • • • '. · ,. • 9 Mississippi "., • • • 4 
Missouri 
· '. • • • 
.., ' • • 9 
Nebraska • • ;', . 4 
Nevada • • 3 
New Jersey • • 2 
New Mexico • '. • • • • · '. • 9 North Carolina •• • • • • .: 7 
Ohio • • • • 4 
Oklahoma • • • • '. • 5 
Rhode Island • • 
,. 3 
South Carolina • • • • • 11 
Tennessee '. . .. • • • • • • 9 
Texas •• • • • .' .. • 7 Utah ... . • • • 5 
Virginia • • • • • • 7 
Washington .', . • • 3 
Wisconsin • • • • • • • • 8 
TOTAL 20 10 26 17 26 25 15 12 10 3 18 5 4 
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